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Introduction
The RSA public key code [1, Chapter 12] is the most widely used encryption
technique in modern communication networks, such as the Internet. Its security
relies on the fact that no known (classical) computer program can efficiently
factor large numbers n, which are the product of two (unknown) primes, p1 and
p2. Quantum computers, which currently exist only as mathematical models
and have not yet been physically built, can perform certain tasks with efficiency
that is not matched by standard computers. In this article we will learn how,
in theory, one such task can be used to factor n in a reasonable amount of
time, thus breaking the RSA code. I studied this algorithm as part of an
independent study cryptography course, which I took with Dr. Fischer. This
article is a summary of a talk I gave on the subject for the undergraduate
colloquium series in August 2002.
The Algorithm
Given the product n of two distinct odd prime numbers p1 and p2, the goal
of the algorithm is to efficiently find p1 and p2, and it attempts to do so via
a certain randomized process. It will suffice, if the algorithm produces the
desired output in 50% of all cases, since repeated application will then quickly
result in success.
This algorithm, which runs on the current mathematical models of quantum
computers, was first conceived by Shor [4]. Our exposition is modeled on
Preskill [3]. Here is the pseudo code:
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Input: A product n of two distinct (unknown) odd prime numbers p1 and p2.
Execute the following routine as often as needed until n has been factored:
Step 1. Randomly, select a number a ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n− 1}.
Step 2. Compute the greatest common divisor gcd(a, n) of a and n.
Step 3. If gcd(a, n) 6= 1, then output “p1 = a and p2 = n/a” and stop;
else continue.
Step 4. [This step requires a quantum computer.]
Find the smallest positive integer r with ar ≡ 1 (mod n).
Step 5. If r is odd, then output “factoring failed in this round” and stop.
Step 6. Compute q =gcd(ar/2 + 1, n).
If q = n, then output “factoring failed in this round” and stop;
else output “p1 = q and p2 = n/q” and stop.
Analysis of the Algorithm
First, we randomly select a number a between 1 and n − 1. Next, we use the
very efficient Euclidean Algorithm [1, Theorem 1.6] to compute the greatest
common divisor gcd(a, n) of a and n. If gcd(a, n) 6= 1, then a = p1 or a = p2,
because the only divisors of n are 1, p1, p2 and n. We will assume the worst
case, where gcd(a, n) = 1, and proceed to Step 4.
Note that the set Z∗n = {k (mod n) | gcd(k, n) = 1} forms a group under
multiplication [1, Corollary 2.10]. Since this group is finite, there is a smallest
positive integer r, called the order of a (mod n), such that ar ≡ 1 (mod n)[1,
Theorem 7.8(1)].
The next step of the algorithm calls for computing the value of r, which
can be done by computing the period of the function f(x) = ax, since
f(x + r) = ax+r = ax · ar = ax · 1 = f(x) (mod n).
It is not feasible to carry out this step on a classical computer. However, a
quantum computer is able to find this period (in theory) in an efficient manner.
(See [2] to learn how.)
If r turns out to be odd, our algorithm fails. From here on, we are going
to assume that r is even. Let us denote the phrase “i divides j” by i|j. Since
ar ≡ 1 (mod n), then
n | (ar − 1) = (ar/2 − 1) · (ar/2 + 1).
We know that n - (ar/2 − 1), otherwise r would not be the order of a. (If
n | (ar/2−1), then ar/2 ≡ 1 (mod n), contradicting the choice of r.) Therefore,
gcd(ar/2 + 1, n) 6= 1. Now if n - (ar/2 + 1), i.e. if ar/2 6≡ −1 (mod n), then n
must have a nontrivial common factor with each of ar/2 ± 1, which we extract
by computing1 gcd(ar/2 + 1, n) ∈ {p1, p2}.
So we succeed in factoring n, unless either r is odd, or r is even and
ar/2 ≡ −1 (mod n).
1A computational note: gcd(ar/2 + 1, n) is found by first reducing ar/2 modulo n. Even
for very large numbers, ar/2 (mod n) can be computed efficiently. This is done by first
expressing the exponent r/2 as the sum of powers of 2 and then repeatedly squaring a, each
36 B.S. Undergraduate Mathematics Exchange, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2003)
How Likely Is Success?
Recall that n = p1 · p2, where p1 and p2 are two distinct odd primes. By the
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) [1, Theorem 13.2], for each pair a1 and a2
of integers with 0 ≤ a1 < p1 and 0 ≤ a2 < p2, there exists exactly one integer
a with 0 ≤ a < p1 · p2, such that
a ≡ a1 (mod p1)
a ≡ a2 (mod p2)
Hence, randomly choosing a ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n − 1} with gcd(a, n) = 1, is equiva-
lent to randomly choosing a1 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p1 − 1} and a2 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p2 − 1},
independently. (Note that ai = 0 corresponds to pi|a.)
Now, let r1 denote the order of a1 (mod p1) and let r2 denote the order of
a2 (mod p2). By the CRT, ax ≡ 1 (mod p1 · p2) is equivalent to
ax ≡ ax1 ≡ 1 (mod p1)
ax ≡ ax2 ≡ 1 (mod p2)
This, in turn, is equivalent to r1 | x and r2 | x [1, Theorem 7.8(3)]. Conse-
quently, since r is the smallest positive x with ax ≡ 1 (mod p1 · p2), then r =
lcm(r1, r2). Therefore, if both r1 and r2 are odd, then so is r and the factoring
attempt fails. If either r1 or r2 is even, then so is r and we proceed.
Since ar ≡ ari ≡ 1 (mod pi), we see that pi | ar − 1 = (ar/2 + 1) · (ar/2 − 1).
However, pi is prime, so that either pi | (ar/2 + 1) or pi | (ar/2 − 1). In other
words:
ar/2 ≡ ±1 (mod p1)
ar/2 ≡ ±1 (mod p2)
We will now analyze the four cases:
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
ar/2 ≡ 1 mod p1 ar/2 ≡ −1 mod p1 ar/2 ≡ −1 mod p1 ar/2 ≡ 1 mod p1
ar/2 ≡ 1 mod p2 ar/2 ≡ −1 mod p2 ar/2 ≡ 1 mod p2 ar/2 ≡ −1 mod p2
ar/2 ≡ 1 mod n ar/2 ≡ −1 mod n ar/2 6≡ −1 mod n ar/2 6≡ −1 mod n
Not Possible Failure Success Success
Let us factor out all of the 2’s from r1 and r2, that is, let us write
r1 = 2C1 ·m1
r2 = 2C2 ·m2
with two odd integers m1 and m2 and Ci ≥ 0.
time reducing the result modulo n. Multiplying the appropriate powers a(2
i) (mod n), while
reducing modulo n after each multiplication, finally yields ar/2 (mod n). This procedure
decreases the number of necessary arithmetic steps on a logarithmic scale.
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Suppose now that C1 > C2, then r = lcm(r1, r2) = 2 ·r2 ·z, for some integer
z, and we claim that ar/2 ≡ 1 (mod p2) and ar/2 ≡ −1 (mod p1), which leads us
to Case 3. To see this, first note that ar/2 ≡ (ar2)z ≡ (ar22 )z ≡ 1z ≡ 1 (mod p2).
And since ar/2 6≡ 1 (mod n), we must have ar/2 6≡ 1 (mod p1). So we obtain
ar/2 ≡ −1 (mod p1).
By symmetry, if C2 > C1, we end up in Case 4.
Now let us suppose that C1 = C2 ≥ 1. Then r = lcm(r1, r2) = r1 · u1 =
r2 · u2, for some odd integers ui. We claim that ar/2 ≡ −1 (mod p1) and
ar/2 ≡ −1 (mod p2), which places us into Case 2. To see this, first notice that





1 6≡ 1 (mod p1). By symmetry we also get ar/2 = a
r2
2 ·u2
2 6≡ 1 (mod p2).
Moreover, r will be odd if and only if C1 = C2 = 0, in which case the
algorithm fails.
In summary, we succeed if and only if C1 6= C2.
We now wish to estimate the likelihood of this to occur. To this end, we view
Ci as a function of the variable ai, whose domain is the set {1, 2, · · · , pi − 1}.
Let Ĉi denote the maximum value of the function Ci. Below, we will show
that the function Ci assumes its maximum value Ĉi for exactly 50% of all
ai ∈ {1, 2, · · · , pi − 1}. For now, let us assume this to be true. Then each of
the following four systems of equations is true exactly 25% of the time:
(1) C1 = Ĉ1 and C2 = Ĉ2;
(2) C1 = Ĉ1 and C2 < Ĉ2;
(3) C1 < Ĉ1 and C2 = Ĉ2;
(4) C1 < Ĉ1 and C2 < Ĉ2.
If Ĉ1 = Ĉ2, we succeed in Situations (2) and (3). If Ĉ1 < Ĉ2, we succeed in
Situations (1) and (3). Finally, if Ĉ1 > Ĉ2, we succeed in Situations (1) and
(2). So, either way, we succeed in at least 50% of all cases—as we claimed we
would.
The remaining task is to verify the following
Lemma. Ci = Ĉi for exactly half of the values of ai ∈ {1, 2, · · · , pi − 1}.
PROOF. Recall that the multiplicative group
Z∗pi = {1 (mod pi), 2 (mod pi), · · · , pi − 1 (mod pi)}
is cyclic [1, Theorem 7.15] and therefore must contain a generating element of
order pi − 1. Let bi (mod pi) be such a generator, that is, suppose
Z∗pi = {b
1
i (mod pi), b
2
i (mod pi), · · · , b
pi−1
i (mod pi)}.
Say, ai (mod pi) = btii (mod pi). Recall that ri is defined to be the order of the
element ai (mod pi). Now, axi ≡ b
ti·x
i ≡ 1 (mod pi) if and only pi − 1|(ti · x),
which is in turn equivalent to
pi − 1
gcd(ti, pi − 1)
| x.
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Therefore,
2Ci ·mi = ri = order(ai) =
pi − 1
gcd(ti, pi − 1)
.
Writing pi − 1 = 2ki · si with ki ≥ 1 and some odd integer si, we see that
Ĉi = ki and that Ci = ki if and only if ti is odd. This happens half of the
time.
Conclusion
We have presented an algorithm, which successfully factors n = p1 · p2 at least
50% of the time and does so efficiently, if implemented on a quantum computer.
Note that repeated execution of this algorithm will result in rapidly increasing
probability of success. Here is a table of accumulative failure probabilities:
Number of Executions Probability of Not Having Factored n
1 (1/2)1 = .500
2 (1/2)2 = .250
3 (1/2)3 = .125
...
...
7 (1/2)7 ≈ .008
Already after 7 executions, this algorithm has a 99.2% chance of succeeding in
factoring n.
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